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WHILE IT MAY BE TRUE THAT "THE KING
CAN DO NO WRONG," WHAT ABOUT HIS
OFFSPRING?: THE LABYRINTHINE LAW OF
ARM - OF - THE - STATE IMMUNITY




One of the most frequent questions I am asked by the students in
my Admiralty class is why I chose to specialize in the area of Maritime
Law while I was in law school and upon graduation. My answer is
simple: because of its eclectic nature. In addition to its own unique
general maritime law legal concepts, such as General Average' ,
Limitation of Liability, 2 and the Personification of the Vessel Theory,
3
*Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law; B.F.A,
The Theatre School at DePaul University; J.D.,Tulane Law School; LL.M.
Admiralty, Tulane Law School. Professor Simpson-Wood currently teaches in
the areas of Admiralty & Maritime Law, Civil Procedure, Conflict of Laws,
and Popular Culture & the Law.
1 The concept of General Average concerns situations where an
extraordinary sacrifice is made or expense incurred by one party to avoid a
peril that threatens an entire maritime venture. As a result, the party incurring
the loss or expenditure has conferred a benefit upon the other parties and has
the right to claim contribution from all who participated in the maritime
adventure so that all share proportionately in the loss. Cia. Atlantica Pacifica,
S.A. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 274 F. Supp. 884, 891 (D. Md. 1967). The
underlying principle of the doctrine was set forth by the Supreme Court in
1870:
Common justice dictates that where two or more parties are
engaged in the same sea risk, and one of them, in a moment
of imminent peril, makes a sacrifice to avoid the impending
danger or incurs extraordinary expenses to promote the
general safety, the loss or expense so incurred shall be
assessed upon all in proportion to the share of each in the
adventure.
The Star of Hope, 76 U.S. 203, 228 (1870).
2 The Limitation of Liability Act is found at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512
(2006). Pursuant to §30505, a vessel owner is permitted to limit his or her
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Maritime Law allows one to study and to practice in basically all other
major areas of civil law. If Civil Procedure is your game, Admiralty
has its own special rules, 4 including its own provision for subject
matter jurisdiction.5 If torts is your preferred area, there are a plethora
of options. Starting with the general maritime law rule that "the owner
of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who are on board ... the duty
of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case,"6 a
number of specialized bodies of tort law can also be discovered
covering such areas as collision, injuries to seamen,8 or to maritime
liability for any claims, debts or losses "arising from any embezzlement, loss,
or destruction of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board
the vessel, any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or any act, matter, or thing,
loss, damage, or forfeiture" to the "value of the vessel and pending freight" as
long as the claim, debt, or loss was "done, occasioned, or incurred, without the
privity or knowledge of the owner."
3 The Personification Theory is "a long-standing admiralty fiction that
a vessel may be assumed to be a person for the purpose of filing a lawsuit and
enforcing ajudgment ..... [A] purpose of the fiction, among others, has been to
allow actions against ships where a person owning the ship could not be
reached .... ." Cont'l Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1960).
Of key importance is the fact that the Personification Theory permits the holder
of a maritime lien to sue the vessel in rem and allows the vessel to be sold
"under the hammer" free and clear of all liens. For a more detailed discussion
of this area see Martin J. Davies, In Defense of Unpopular Virtues.
Personification and Ratification, 75 TUL L. REv. 337 (2000).
4 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h), Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(c), Fed R. Civ. P.
Supp. R. A-G (2006). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 which provides that an
admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 9(h) is not a civil action for the
purposes of the federal venue statues. The result is that for the venue will
properly lie "in any district where the parties are subject to personal jurisdiction
and can be served with process" for cases qualifying as maritime under Rule
9(h). I & M Rail Link v. Northstar Navigation, 21 F. Supp. 849, 857 (N.D. Ill.
1998).
5 Federal district courts have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the state
courts over "[any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28
U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2006)
6 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632
(1959)
7 See, e.g., The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125, 136 (1874) (setting forth
the Pennsylvania Rule which establishes that when a ship at the time of a
collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule or regulation intended to
prevent collisions, "the burden rests upon the ship of showing not merely that
her fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it probably was not, but
that it could not have been." See also The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186 (1895)
(establishing the presumption that a moving vessel that strikes a stationary
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workers who do not qualify as seamen.9  If you thrive on Contracts,
the ins and outs of Charter Parties ° could fascinate for years to come.
object is negligent); The Louisiana, 70 U.S. 164 (1865) (creating the
presumption that a vessel which drifts into a stationary object is at fault).
8 See The Jones Act (Merchant Marine Act of 1920), 46 U.S.C. §
30104 (2006). On February 6, 1920, Senator Wesley L. Jones of Washington,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, introduced the provisions of
the Act addressing seamen's remedies as the final section of S. Res. 3876, 66th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1920); see Kenneth G. Engerrand & Jeffly R. Bale,
Seaman Status Reconsidered, 24 S. TEx. L. J. 431, 438, n. 56, 60 (1983).
Attaining Jones Act seaman status permits seamen to sue for injuries resulting
from the negligence of their employers. It is also the trigger for recovery under
the general maritime law remedies of maintenance and cure and
unseaworthiness. See Jack L. Allbritton, Seaman Status in Wilanders's Wake,
68 TUL. L. REv. 373, 374 (1994) (citing Martin J. Norris, THE LAW OF SEAMEN
section 27:1, at 191-193 (4th ed. 1985); David W. Robertson, The Supreme
Court's Approach to Determining Seaman Status: Discerning the Law Amid
Loose Language and Catchphrases, 34 J. MAR. L & CoM. 547 (2003) (noting
that the combination of these three remedies result in seamen being viewed as
the "most generously-treated personal injury victims in American law.")
Prior to the enactment of the Jones Act, a seaman was not entitled to
bring an action for negligence against his employer due to the fellow servant
doctrine. Rather, an injured seaman was limited to the traditional maritime
remedies of wages, maintenance and cure, and an action for unseaworthiness
against the vessel. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903)
9 See The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
("LHWCA") 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006). The LHWCA is the compensation
scheme ultimately devised by Congress to provide protection for shore-based
maritime workers. The LHWCA provides compensation remedies to maritime
employees for disability or death resulting from injuries occurring on navigable
waters. At the time of its enactment, its purpose was to place maritime
workers, other than the master and crew members who solely fell within Jones
Act coverage, on the same footing as land-based workers entitled to state
worker's compensation benefits. The LHWCA was eventually enacted after
prior Congressional attempts to extend state compensation benefits to maritime
workers had been repeatedly thwarted by the Supreme Court. See Engerrand &
Bale, supra note 7 at 441-445 for an excellent discussion of this process.
In 1972, Congress provided maritime workers who were not masters or
members of the crew with a 905(b) action, which provides for actions against
the vessel as a third party for injuries caused by vessel negligence. 33 U.S.C. §
905(b) (2006) ("In the event of injury to a person covered under this Act by the
negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as
a third party ....")
10 "A charter party is 'a specialized form of contract for the hire of an
entire ship, specified by name.' [A] time charter provides for the charterer to
156 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 5.153
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
For those who gravitate toward Property law, delving into the unique
aspects of the Laws of Finds and Salvage 1 should have its rewards.
The inclusive nature of Maritime Law was once again in
evidence as I began my search for a topic for this symposium. I decided
to review cases decided during 2008 which exemplified the intersection
between maritime law, ports, and arbitration. Despite these limited
obtain the vessel for a fixed period of time, and under a voyage charter, the
charterer obtains the vessel for the length of the voyage." Keytrade UDA, Inc.
v. Ain Temouchment M/V, 404 F.3d 891, 892, n.1 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, § 11-1 (4th ed.
2001)). Under both the time and voyage charter, while the charterer obtains the
use of the ship, the owner continues to operate the vessel. DAVID W.
ROBERTSON, STEVEN F. FRIEDELL, MICHAEL F. STURLEY, ADMIRALTY AND
MARITIME LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 334-338 (2d ed. 2008). In contrast,
there stands the bareboat or demise charter. Under the demise or bareboat
charter, complete control of the vessel is given to the charterer for a set period
of time. The vessel is manned with a master and crew selected by the charterer
and she "makes his voyages and carries the cargo he chooses .... It has long
been recognized in the of law admiralty that for many, if not most, purposes,
the bareboat charterer is to be treated as the owner, generally called the owner
pro hac vice." Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 412 (1963). In recent years an
additional type of charter has gained in popularity known as the "slot" or
"space" charter. Such a charter permits the charter of less than the entire ship.
For example, a charterer might "obtain a specific number of 'slots' on a
container vessel. See Robertson, Friedell, and Sturley, supra note 4 at 339. The
freight or the amount due for carrying the specific cargo would be based on
"the capacity booked per voyage" or "on the capacity actually used on a time
basis." Id.
1 "Historically, courts have applied the maritime law of salvage when
ships or their cargo have been recovered from the bottom of the sea by those
other than their owners. Under this law, the original owners still retain their
ownership interests in the property, although the salvors are entitled to a very
liberal salvage award." Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atl. Mut. Ins.
Co., 974 F.2d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 1992). The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1(1869) (setting
forth the six traditional factors on which a salvage award is based). "A related
legal doctrine is the common law of finds, which expresses the ancient and
honorable principle of 'finders, keepers' Traditionally, the law of finds was
applied only to maritime property which had never been owned by anybody,
such as ambergris, whales, and fish. A relatively recent trend in the law,
though, has seen the law of finds applied to lost and abandoned shipwrecks."
Id. at 459-460; see also R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked & Abandoned
Vessel, 435 F.3d 521 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that a salvor-in-possession of an
historic wreck could not convert its status to that of a finder); Sea Services of
the Keys, Inc. v. The Abandoned 20-foot Midnight Express Vessel, 16 F. Supp.
2d 1369 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (law of finds applicable where vessel rescued had
been abandoned after being used in criminal activity).
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parameters, the opinions I found satisfying my criteria ran the gamut.
They included cases concerning the issue of whether admiralty subject
matter jurisdiction could be properly asserted over arbitration defense
costs arising out of a charter party dispute 12 or over a contract for the
sale of a vessel, 13 to those focusing on the question of whether
arbitration should be compelled where the vessel owner was a non-
signatory to the arbitration agreement but the vessel was being sued in
rem14 or in Jones Act claim situations, 5 from a decision analyzing what
12 Naias Marine, S.A. v. Trans Pac. Carriers Co. Ltd., 2008 WL 111003
(S.D.N.Y.), 2008 A.M.C. 92 (finding no admiralty subject matter jurisdiction
where plaintiff sought recovery of arbitration defense costs arising out of the
parties' arbitration agreement contained in the charter party).
13 Kalafrana Shipping Ltd. v. Sea Gull Shipping Co., Ltd., 2008 WL
4489790 (S.D.N.Y.) In Kalafrana, the court held that in light of Norfolk
Southern Ry. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14 (2004) and Folksamerica Reinsurance Co.
v. Clean Water of N.Y., 413 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2005), the long standing rule in
the Second Circuit that contracts for the sale of a vessel are not maritime was
no longer viable. Id. at *3. "As the Court noted in Kirby, whether a contract
falls within admiralty jurisdiction depends on 'the nature and character of the
contract."' Id. (citing Kirby, 543 U.S. at 24). Examining the agreement at issue
in Kalafrana, the district court found it was "a contract for the purchase of a
launched ship that had been plying the seas for some time. As such it has a
distinctly 'salty flavor,' for the sole purpose of a ship is to sail." Thus, it was a
maritime contract and within federal admiralty jurisdiction. Id.
The court hedged its bets by noting that even if Kirby and Folksamerica
were read as being limited to cases involving "mixed contracts, there was still
admiralty jurisdiction over the agreement in the case." Id. at *4. The contract
was not only for the sale of the vessel, but also for necessary repairs. As such,
it was a mixed contract comparable to those at issue in Kirby and
Folksamerica. Id. The contract "cannot be excluded from admiralty
jurisdiction simply because the disputes [under the contract] involve, in part,
the sale of a vessel." Id. Whether mixed contracts falls "within admiralty
jurisdiction depends on whether they make 'reference to maritime service or
maritime transactions."' Id. (quoting Kirby, 543 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted)).
It does not depend "on whether the non-maritime components are properly
characterized as 'incidental' to the contract." Id. (quoting Folksamerica, 413
F.3d at 15 (citations omitted)). "[A]dmiralty jurisdiction would undoubtedly
exist if Kalafrana had entered into a vessel repair contract alone." Id. (citing
Flota Maritime Browning de Cuba, Sociadad Anonima v. Snobl, 363 F.2d 733,
736 (4th Cir. 1966). The court could find "no intuitive reason why the same
repairs... fail to do so if undertaken to a sales agreement." Id. (quoting Gaster
Marine v. MIV The Restless, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1335). Therefore, the contract
in Kalafrana was maritime. Id.
14 The Rice Co. (Suisse), S.A. v. Precious Flowers Ltd., 523 F.3d 528
(5th Cir. 2008) (refusing to enforce an arbitration clause in a voyage charter
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against a vessel owner where the vessel owner who had time chartered the
vessel was not a party to the later voyage charter entered into by the time
charterer/disponent owner and the shipper even if the terms of the voyage
charter had been incorporated into the bill of lading and even though the vessel
was sued in rem). "A Bill of Lading is a 'document which is signed by the
carrier or his agent acknowledging that goods have been shipped on board a
specific vessel that is bound for a particular destination and stating the terms on
which the goods are to be caried."' Id. at 531, n.l (citing Hale Container Line,
Inc. v. Houston Sea Packing Co., 137 F.3d 1455, 1462, n.12 (11th Cir. 1998)
(quoting THoMs J. SCHOENBAUM, 2 ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAWS § 10-11
at 44 (2nd ed. 1994)).
15 During 2008, two interesting cases arose in this area, one concerning
international arbitration and the United Nations Conventions on Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "Convention"), 9 U.S.C. §§
202-208 (2002), and the other, the "ward of the court doctrine and the Federal
Arbitration Act (the "FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2002).
In Vavaru v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 2008 WL 649178 (S.D.
Fla.), plaintiff allegedly sustained a back injury during his term of employment
as a waiter on the defendant's ship. Id. at *2. The employment relationship was
governed by a Sign-On Employment Agreement ("SOEA'). Id. The SOEA
incorporated and made part of the employment agreement the Collective
Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between the defendant employer and the
Norwegian Seafareres' Union (the "Union"). Id. The plaintiff was provided
with a copy of the CBA at the time of executing the SOEA. Id. The CBA
provided in relevant part that if grievances could not be decided by the Master,
then they should be resolved by the Union. Id. at *3. If that failed, all
grievances "shall be referred to and resolved exclusively by binding arbitration
pursuant to" the Convention. Id. The cause before the Vavaru court was
whether to compel foreign arbitration in the Bahamas. Id. at * 1. The plaintiff
argued that there was "a potential disparity between the Union's interest and
[his] interests with respect to the prosecution of Plaintiffs rights under the
Jones Act." Id. at *5 (citing Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117
F.3d 519, 525 (1 1th Cir. 1997)). After reviewing the distinctions made by two
Supreme Court decisions, Alexander v. Gardener-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974) and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the
court ruled that "because the SOEA incorporated by reference the CBA
containing the arbitration agreement... and Plaintiff was provided with a copy
of the CBA ...the arbitration agreement at issue in this case is, like the
agreement in Gilmer, an individual contractual agreement to submit to
arbitration rather than a mere collective bargaining agreement not to do so, as
in Alexander." Id. at *6. In compelling arbitration, the court specifically noted
that the plaintiff "has not demonstrated that Congress intended to preclude
waiver of a judicial forum for Jones Act claims." Id at *6, n.14 (citing
Brisentine v. Stone and Weber Engineering Corp., 117 F.3d, 519, 523 (citing
the Gilmer Court's holding that "because the would-be-plaintiff in that case had
'made the bargain to arbitrate,' the burden was on him 'to show that Congress
had intended to preclude a waiver of ajudicial forum for ADEA claims.')).
2009] WHILE IT MAY BE TRUE THAT "THE KING 159
CAN Do No WRONG", WHAT ABOUT His
OFFSPRING?
constituted "exhaustion" under a Longshore Workers collective
bargaining agreement, 16 to opinions determining whether property was
Barbieri v. K-Sea Transp. Corp., 566 F. Supp. 2d 187 (E.D. N. Y. 2008),
concerned a seaman seeking damages for lower back injuries he allegedly
sustained while he was working on a petroleum barge. The court conducted a
bench trial and found that after he was injured, the plaintiff had signed "an
agreement to arbitrate all claims arising out of his injuries" in order to receive
"two-thirds of his average net weekly wage as an advance against settlement"
in addition to the $15 per day maintenance payment he had been receiving from
his employer as required by the collective bargaining agreement in effect
between the employer and the seaman's union. Id. at 189. At the time he signed
the agreement to arbitrate, the seaman was informed that "he was under no duty
to accept this offer and that he would continue to receive the $15 per day
minimum maintenance payment as well as cure regardless of whether he signed
the agreement." Id. He was also informed that the signed document "would be
a legally enforceable contract." Id. Plaintiff "acknowledged at the time that he
realized that he had a right to sue in court to recover damages and that if he
signed the agreement he would be giving up his right to sue in court and be
limited to arbitrate his damage claims." Id. The plaintiff also testified that none
of his "discussions" with his employer "leading up to his decision" to sign the
arbitration agreement "came at a time when he was otherwise vulnerable or
extraordinarily susceptible to pressure." Id.
At trial, the court found most of the plaintiffs arguments as to why the
agreement was unenforceable to be "insubstantial" Id. at 194. As an initial
matter, however, plaintiff did argue that the "ward of the admiralty" doctrine
should shift the normal burden of proof from the party challenging an
agreement to arbitrate to the party seeking to enforce the agreement. Id. at 191-
192. Under the ward of the admiralty doctrine, "the burden is upon one who
sets up a seaman's release to show that it was executed freely, without
deception or coercion and that it was made by the seaman with full
understanding of his rights." Id. at 191 (quoting Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942)). Plaintiff contended that the court should
analyze the enforceability of the [Claims Arbitration] Agreement as it is
required to do by the Federal Arbitration Act . . . through the prism of the
"wards of the admiralty framework." Id. In other words, according to the
plaintiff, the contract at issue would be invalid unless it is shown to be fair to
the seaman and untainted by deception, duress or any other factor that might
bar its enforcement in equity. Id. In rejecting plaintiffs argument, the court
distinguished Garrett, which concerned the release of a claim not an agreement
to arbitrate, and noted that "arbitration is not a penalty." Id. at 192. Rather,
"[t]he availability of arbitration only expands the avenues of redress open to the
'ward of the admiralty."' Id.
16 Ayala v. Pac. Mar. Assoc., 2008 WL 1886021 (N.D. Cal.). In Ayala,
the plaintiffs were registered longshoremen working at the port of San
Francisco-Oakland who desired to transfer pursuant to their labor contract to
the port of Los Angeles-Long Beach. Id. at *1. They alleged that their transfer
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properly attached pursuant to Rule B where an action has been brought
against port agents who allegedly issued without proper authority bills
of lading 17 marked "freight prepaid."' 8
was being blocked by the Pacific Maritime Association and by the International
Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and their local branch of the ILWU,
"in violation of their right to equal treatment under deferral labor laws and in
breach of the collective bargaining agreement." Id. The defendants moved to
dismiss the case, arguing, inter alia, that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust the
grievance procedures set out in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at *7.
They further suggested immediate arbitration as an option, arguing that "under
the unique circumstances . . . all parties would be best served by having
plaintiffs' transfer grievance promptly submitted to" arbitration "for a final and
binding ruling." Id. The court found "no cogent rationale ... for having the
Plaintiffs leapfrog to the final stage of the grievance procedure [arbitration of
disputes arising under a collective bargaining agreement] as consolation for the
fact their earlier efforts to exhaust were ignored." Id. Rather, the court held
that the plaintiffs had adequately exhausted the grievance procedures and
denied defendants' motion to dismiss and to compel exhaustion. Id. at *8.
17 A bill of lading is "a document that indicates the receipt of goods for
shipment and that is issued by a person engaged in the business of transporting
or forwarding goods." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 159 (7th ed. 1999).
18 Not surprisingly, because New York City is the center of the financial
world, the District Court for the Southern District of New York handles a
number of Rule B attachment cases. See Greg Morcroft & Robert Schroeder,
MarketWatch (Jan. 22, 2007), New York as Financial Center Seen Threatened
("The United States needs to reshape its accounting, legal and regulatory
structure if New York city is to remain the world's preeminent financial center.
...") available at http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/new-york-financial-
center-seen/story.aspx?guid=%7B5962CC23 (last visited Feb. 5, 2009). In the
Southern District, a typical Rule B attachment scenario might go as follows:
Foreign corporations enter into a maritime contract
of charter party which provides for arbitration of any
disputes in London. Disputes arise. The party asserting
claims against the other initiates arbitration in London. The
parties instruct solicitors. In order to obtain security for an
anticipated (or at least hoped for) arbitration award, the
solicitors for the claiming party instruct counsel in this
district to file a complaint in admiralty with this [c]ourt
against the other party and obtain from the [clourt a writ of
maritime attachment under Rule B. The writ is conditioned
upon the claim being maritime in nature and the plaintiffs
inability to find the defendant within the district for service
of process. If those conditions appear from the initial
pleadings, a Judge of this[c]ourt issues the writ. The writ
of maritime attachment extends to all property of the
defendant that may be found within the district, including
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The case which really caught my interest, however, was Puerto
Rico Ports Authority v. Carnival Corporation.19  This on-going
litigation concerns the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (PRPA) and its
claim of sovereign immunity. 20 Whether this claim of immunity from
electronic fund transfers taking place between banks. It is
customary for counsel for such a plaintiff to cause process
of attachment to be served upon a number of New York
City banks.
Pagane Mar., Ltd. v. Glingrow Holding, Ltd, 2008 WL 276489 (S.D. N.Y.)
(citing Winter Storm Shipping, Ltd. v. TPI, 310 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2002). Two
cases were decided during 2008, however, which departed from this typical
scenario by involving claims not between parties to a charter agreement, but
between a charterer and a port or shipping agents. In Padre Shipping, Inc. v.
Yong He Shipping, 553 F. Supp.2d 328 (S.D. N.Y. 2008), the court ruled that
a Liberian vessel owner had a valid prima facie admiralty claim against a
Chinese port agent for its alleged violation of an authorization letter due to its
issuance without proper authority of bills of lading marked "freight pre-paid".
Id. at 332-333. The court reiterated that "[u]nder the law of this circuit, EFTs
[electronic funds transfers] to or from a party are attachable by a court as they
pass through banks located in that court's jurisdiction." Id. at 334 (quoting
AquaStoli Shipping, Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty, Ltd., 460 F.3d 434, 436 (2d
Cir. 2006) (citing Winter Storm Shipping, Ltd. v. TPI, 310 F.3d 263 (2d cir.
2002)). Despite the port agent's argument that the EFTs at issue represented the
funds of other clients, the court found that "the funds wired to and from [the
port agent's] bank account constitute[d]" the port agent's "property" and
consequently were subject to maritime attachment under Rule B. Id. at 334-35.
In a factually analogous case, Navision Shipping A/S v. Yong He Shipping
(HK), Ltd., 570 F. Supp.2d 527 (S.D. N. Y. 2008), the court also upheld its
issuance of maritime attachment to a shipping company against a shipping
company based in China finding that "[a]s maritime agreements often include
restrictions on the issuance of bills of lading for the purpose of preserving a
party's right to exercise cargo liens, a port agent who issues bills of lading
marked prepaid when it has been expressly instructed not to do so may very
well be breaching its duty to act with reasonable care." Id. at 532 (citing Padre
Shipping, Inc. v. Yong He Shipping , 553 F. Supp.2d 328, 330 (S.D. N.Y.
2008)).
19 2008 WL 4449957 (D. Puerto Rico).
20 Id. at *1. The issue of sovereign immunity also arose during 2008
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1602, et seq.
(2006). In Ocean Line Holdings, Ltd. v. China National Chartering Corp.,
2008 WL 4369262 (S.D.N.Y.), the district court had ordered attachment of
certain assets of a Chinese charterer due to damages arising from the loss of a
vessel. The claim for damages was disputed, and in accordance with the terms
of the charter party, the issues would be resolved in arbitration proceedings in
London. Id. at * 1. The Chinese charterer brought a motion to vacate the
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suit is recognized will be the key to whether a Petition for Confirmation
of an Arbitration Award filed by Carnival is decided by a federal court
or whether PRPA's Petition to Vacate the same award as unlawful and
contrary to the public policy of the Commonwealth 21 is resolved before
the Puerto Rico Commonwealth Court of First Instance, San Juan
Part.22 In addition to the import the ruling in Carnival may have on the
continued viability of arbitration awards where a port authority is a
party to the arbitration agreement, the resolution of the sovereign
immunity issue in Carnival will require application of the tortuous arm-
of-the-state doctrine, the current approach for determining when special
purpose public corporations, such as a port authority, may claim
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. The facts of the Carnival
case provide an excellent opportunity to starkly illustrate the problems
which presently exist in this area due to the confusion of the lower
courts in how to properly apply the various factors of the elusive test
which has been crafted by the Supreme Court.2 3
Part one of this article will provide an overview of the Supreme
Court's ann-of-the-state jurisprudence which is relevant to the issue of
immunity for special purpose corporations, such as port authorities.
Part two will delve into the specific factual background of the Carnival
case. Part three will compare and contrast the approaches emanating
from the First and Eleventh Circuits2 4 in recent arm-of-the-state case
attachment due to its immunity under the FSIA "as an instrumentality of the
People's Republic of China" Id. The district court found that the Chinese
charterer was a subsidiary of its parent company. Id. at *3. Consequently, the
charterer was not an instrumentality and its property was not protected from
prejudgment attachment under the FSIA. Id. at *4.
21 Amicus Curiae Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Remand of
the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, P.R. Ports Auth. v. Carnival Corp., 2008 WL
822349 (D. Puerto Rico) ("the arbitration award plainly violates
Commonwealth law and public policies.").
22 id.
23 Hector G. Bladuell, Note, Twins or Triplets?: Protecting the Eleventh
Amendment Through a Three-Prong Arm-of -the -State Test, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 837, 838 (2007) ("Although the Supreme Court has extended Eleventh
Amendment immunity to a wide variety of [state created entities], no practical
and uniform method exists for determining whether such an entity is entitled to
it. Federal courts.., have created different 'arm-of-the-state tests' to make the
determination as to whether a particular entity should benefit from the state's
immunity from suit.").
24 1 have chosen to evaluate the Carnival case under the approach
employed by the First and Eleventh Circuits for a specific reason. Carnival
originally filed its Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Carnival, 2008 WL
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decisions. This final portion of the paper will also examine a sister
case, Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. Federal Maritime Commission,
25
which was decided by the D.C. Circuit in 2008 and in which a Petition
of Certiorari has been filed.26 The differing aspects of the various
approaches employed by this sampling of the courts of appeals will
then be applied to the facts of Carnival to illustrate that guidance from
the Supreme Court is clearly needed in this important area of the law.
I1. THE ARM-OF-THE-STATE DOCTRINE: THE CREATION OF
A LABYRINTH
Whether a port authority will be entitled to Eleventh Amendment
protection will be determined by the application of one facet of the law
of sovereign immunity, the arm-of-the-state doctrine. That arm-of-the-
state immunity has been characterized as being in a state of "disarray
27
and resulting from Supreme Court decisions which have produced
"unwelcome complexity' ' 2 8 is not surprising considering the entire body
of jurisprudence surrounding the Eleventh Amendment.29 Viewed as
4449957 at *1. PRPA responded by bringing a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, which is still pending before the Southern District of
Florida. Id. After Carnival filed its Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration
Award, PRPA filed its Petition to Vacate the Arbitration Award before the
Commonwealth Court in San Juan. Id. Carnival then removed the state lawsuit
to the Federal District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. Id. The district
court in Puerto Rico has now stayed the action before it until the district court
in Florida resolves the jurisdictional issue. Id. at *2. Consequently, if the
district court in Florida, which falls within the Eleventh Circuit, finds it has
proper jurisdiction, it will probably be called upon to rule on the sovereign
immunity issue. If not, such a ruling would likely fall to the federal district
court in Puerto Rico, which falls within the First Circuit. See infra notes 140-
141.
25 531 F.3d 868 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
26 2008 WL 4525349 (U.S.), petition of cert. filed (U.S. Oct. 3, 2008).
27 Alex E. Rogers, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign
Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1243 (1992).
28 Puerto Rico Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 531 F.3d 868, 883-84
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Williams, J., concurring)
29 U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment was ratified in
1789 in response to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793), which
held that a citizen of South Carolina was entitled to recover from the State of
Georgia an outstanding debt arising from the sale of Revolutionary War
supplies even though the State had not consented to suit. For an excellent
discussion of the Chisholm decision, see William A. Fletcher, A Historical
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"one of the mysteries of legal evolution, 3 ° the concept of Sovereign
Immunity3' and the debate surrounding the proper scope of the states'
immunity from suit has resulted in the Supreme Court blazing a
jurisprudential path that can only be characterized as divisive.32
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial Power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State ... ,33 The Court, however, has elected not
to be bound by the specific text of the Amendment. Rather, finding
that "the bare text of the Amendment is not an exhaustive description
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1045-63 (1983).
30 Angela S. Fetcher, Note, Outdated, Confusing, and Unfair: A
Glimpse at Sovereign Immunity in Kentucky, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 959, 960 (2003)
(citing Stefan Schnopp, Note, Garrett v. Sandusky: Justice Pfeifer's Fight for
Full & Fair Legal Redress: Does Sovereign Immunity Violate Ohio's "Open
Court" Provision, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 729, 732 (1996) (quoting Edwin M.
Bourchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 36 Yale L.J. 1,4 (1926)). See also
Gregory Wicker, Comment, Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina
Ports Authority: Judicial Incursions Into Executive Power, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
1555, 1559 (2004) (noting that "many commentators have described the
Court's current state sovereignty jurisprudence as mystifying or suspicious...
.")(citations omitted)).
3' The principle underlying sovereign immunity was that "the King
could do no wrong." Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) ("And, first, the
law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-eminence . . .
[H]ence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil
matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction
implies superiority of power. .") (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 234-35(1765)).
32 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743
(Breyer, J., Dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice
Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsberg, castigated the majority for
endorsing an expanded view of sovereign immunity protection that "lacks any
firm anchor in the Constitution's text", Id. at 777, and "reaffirm[ed] the need
for continued dissent" from the path chosen by the majority. Id. at 788. See
also Mark D. Falkoff, Abrogating State Sovereign Immunity in Legislative
Courts, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 853 (2001) (contending that the Supreme Court
has expanded state immunity from suit by private individuals in a manner that
"contravenes" the rule of law); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a
Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1561, 1564 (2002)
(noting "[tihese decisions have created an outcry in the academy").
33 U.S. Const. amend. XI.
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of the states' constitutional immunity from suit,"'3 4 the majority of the
Court35 has elected to employ an expansive interpretation of the
language of the Eleventh Amendment to extend principles of
federalism.36 This sweeping jurisprudence37 has also addressed the
34 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 736 (1999) (Kennedy, J.); see also
Sean M. Monahan, Note, A Tempest in the Teapot: State Sovereign Immunity
and Federal Administrative Adjudications in Federal Maritime Commission v.
South Carolina State Ports Authority, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1794, 1796 ("the
scope of the states' immunity from private suits reaches beyond the text of the
Eleventh Amendment to encompass the 'fundamental postulates implicit in
the constitutional design."' (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 729).
35 The majority was generally composed of five Justices - Chief Justice
Rehnquist, with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas who
consistently voted together to increase states' protection from "the effects of
federal legislation aimed at regulating them." Professor Gordon G. Young,
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority: Small
Iceberg or Just the Tip?, 47 ST. Louis L. J. 971, 977 (2003); see also, Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CI. L. REv. 429 (2002); Seth P. Waxman, Shifting the
Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign
Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1115 (2001).
36 Christopher G. Paulraj, Note and Comment, Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority: Extending the States'
Sovereign Immunity to Administrative Adjudications, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 679,
680 (2003) (commenting that the Court "has extended the principles of
federalism to new heights, resulting in a drastic curtailment of the federal
government's ability to regulate the states and their instrumentalities.") (citing
Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a Way to Enforce
Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 636 (2000) (noting that the "personnel
change" on the Court "enabled the federal-enforcing side to gain
ascendancy")).
37 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,
747 (2002) (expanding sovereign immunity into the area of agency adjudication
by holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit is a valid defense in a
privately initiated complaint case before a federal agency); Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ala. V. Garrett, 531 U.S., 374 (2001) (ruling that the Americans with
Disabilities Act improperly abrogated States' Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (finding that
irrespective of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's clear statement of
Congress' intent to abrogate states' immunity, such abrogation exceeded
Congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot subject a State to suit
in its own state court without its consent); Seminole Tribe of Fla. V. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (establishing that Congress may not infringe upon a
state's sovereignty in order to regulate commerce). See generally, Scott
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issue of whether Eleventh Amendment Immunity from suit should
extend to state instrumentalities or entities in cases where the state is
not a named party in the action.38 Irrespective of the fact that the
Amendment appears to confer immunity only upon "one of the United
States," Supreme Court jurisprudence has given birth to the "Arm-of-
the-State" doctrine in order to support such an extension of the
Eleventh Amendment shield from suit.
39
Prior to its creation of the arm-of-the-state doctrine, the Court
followed a longstanding rule grounded in the fact that sovereign
immunity is rooted in the doctrine of personal jurisdiction.4 ° Under this
approach, a state had the power to waive its own immunity or "to create
separate legal persons that do not share the immunity."'41 Consequently,
sovereign immunity did "not extend to corporations that the sovereign
(i.e., a state or the federal government) has created as separate legal
persons. 42  Under this approach, "the only jurisdictional inquiry
necessary" to determine whether a state created entity such as the
PRPA was entitled to sovereign immunity would have been "to
examine the entity's organic structure and determine whether it was a
corporation and a legal person capable of appearing in its own name. 43
If this rule was still in effect today, the outcome in the Carnival case
would easily be determined. Under the laws of Puerto Rico, the Ports
Authority is not only "given the power to sue and be sued, it was
established as a "public corporation with a legal existence and
Fruehwald, The Supreme Court's Confusing State Sovereign Immunity
Jurisprudence, 56 DRAKE L. REv. 253 (2008); Joseph M. Pellicciotti & Michael
J. Pellicciotti, Sovereign Immunity & Congressionally Authorized Private Party
Actions Against the Statesfor Violation of Federal Law: A Consideration of the
U.S. Supreme Court's Decade Long Decisional Trek, 1996-2006, 59 BAYLOR
L. REV. 623 (2007).
38 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) ("It
has long been settled that the reference to actions against one of the United
States encompasses not only actions in which a state is actually named as the
defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and instrumentalities.")
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
39 See Rogers, supra note 27 at 1245.
40 P. R. Ports Authority v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 531 F.3d 868, 881 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (Williams, J., concurring) (citing Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity
as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1559 (2002)).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 882. See, e.g. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31
(1890) (holding that county was amenable to suit despite the fact that it was an
"integral part of the State" because it is also a corporation created by and with
such powers as are given to it by the State .... )
41 Id. at 883-84.
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personality separate and apart from those of the Government [of Puerto
Rico] and any officials thereof."44 Clearly, the Ports Authority would
not be entitled to immunity. The current legal landscape is not so
simple.
The death knell for the bright-line approach began to toll in 1977
with the Mt. Healthy decision. 5 The entity at issue in Mt. Healthy, the
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education (District Board),
acknowledged that under state law, it was able to sue and be sued.46
Despite this admission, the Court chose to ignore its prior rule that "a
state's government corporation, with a general capacity of suing and
being sued in their own names, were ipso facto completely bereft of
sovereign immunity., 47 Instead, for the first time, the Court "implicitly
extend[ed] its cautious rule" for a state to have waived its sovereign
immunity "into the context of state government corporations, finding it
unlikely that the state at issue "had consented to suit against its
corporate offspring. 48
To balance the possible tension between the longstanding rule
and the newly recognized extension of waiver into the context of
government entities, the Mt. Healthy Court crafted a balancing test of
"family resemblance" 49 which measured whether the Board was "more
like a county or city than it is like an arm of the State. 5 ° In applying
the test, the Court focused mainly upon four factors: the District
Board's status or designation under state law;5' the degree of
supervision the State Board of Education exercised over the District
Board; the amount of funding the District Board received from the
state; and the District Board's ability to generate its own revenue which
might be used to satisfy a judgment rendered against the District
44 Id. at 884 (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, § 333(b)).
45 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. (1977).
Mt. Healthy is also considered the start of the Court's "modem arm-of-the-state
jurisprudence." Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Resources, Inc. v. P.R. &
the Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr., 322 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2003).
46 Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 531 F.3d at 883 (citing OHio REV. CODE
§ 3313.17, cited in Brief of Petitioners, Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 1976 Wi
181610, at *28 (1976)).
47 id.
48 Id. (quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 279-80).
49 id.
" Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280.
5' Id. at 280 (finding that under Ohio law, school districts were
classified as political subdivisions).
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Board.52 In holding that the District Board was a political subdivision,
not an arm of the state, 53 the Court did provide a general approach to
arm-of-the-state inquiries. It failed completely, however, to provide
any guidance as to the comparative weight each factor of the balancing
test should receive or whether there were additional criteria that could
be considered when engaging in the new methodology. 54 With this
oversight, the first path of the arm-of-the-state labyrinth had been trod.
Confusion concerning the viability of the Mt. Healthy balancing
test was generated two years later when the Court ignored some
previously utilized factors and employed additional variables in Lake
Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 55 The entity at
issue in Lake County, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA),
was the product of an interstate compact between California and
Nevada.56 In ruling that the TRPA was not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment Immunity,5 7 the Court based its ruling on six factors. As
in Mt. Healthy, it still considered how the entity was designated under
the relevant law58 and whether it received funding from the state.59
Also comparable to Mt. Healthy, the Court examined the level of state
control, finding that the states had no power to veto the rules
promulgated by the TRPA.60 In contrast to Mt. Healthy, the issue of
whether the entity could generate its own revenue was not addressed.6'
The new factors consisted of: (1) examining the nature of the function
of the entity: was it one normally performed by the state or local
52 Id. (finding that while the Ohio Board of Education did provide some
guidance and funding to the school district, the districts had extensive powers
to raise revenue by issuing bonds and levying taxes).
53 Id. (finding that "on balance," the District Board "is more like a
county or city" than an arm of the state).
54 See Rogers, supra note 27, at 1263.
'5 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
56 Id. at 393-94. In order to conserve natural resources, the TRPA was
created to coordinate and regulate development in the Lake Tahoe Basin. Such
a bi-state entity is known as a Compact Clause entity. Id.
57 Id. at 392 (concluding that the bi-state Compact had "created an
agency comparable to a country or municipality").
58 Id. at 402. (finding that the interstate compact described TRPA as a
"separate legal entity" and a "political subdivision"); see supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
9 Id. (finding that counties and cities supplied TRPA's funding); see
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
60 Id.; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
61 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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governments; 62 (2) examining state control on the basis of whether the
majority of directors were appointed by the governor or counties and
cities; 63 and (3) considering whether the entity's obligations would be
binding on the state. 64 Once again, the Court failed to provide guidance
as to how the new factors should be ranked in terms of weight or as to
whether the new six factor test superseded the prior four-prong analysis
of Mt. Healthy.65
The unworkable nature of the multi-factored inquiry soon
became evident as the lower courts struggled to apply the arm-of-the-
state test. Certain courts did not view the list of factors set out in Lake
Country Estates as "exclusive 66 and expanded the universe of relevant
criteria for the test,67 while others gave different weight to the various
factors to be considered.68
The confusion of the lower courts was graphically illustrated
when the Second and Third Circuits reached opposite conclusions as to
whether a bi-state compact entity, the Port Authority of New York and
69 etteNew Jersey, was entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
Although both nominally employed the six-prong Lake Country Estates
test, each applied its own recipe for the multifactor arm-of-the-state
62 Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 402 (finding that TRPA's function,
the regulation of land, was performed by local, not state, governments).
63 Id. (finding that a greater percentage of the directors had been
appointed by the county).
64 Id. (under the compact, the obligations of TRPA were not binding on
either state).
65 See Rogers, supra note 27, at 1264.
66 Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Port Auth., 819 F.2d 413, 417
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987) ("We do not read Lake Country
Estates as setting out an exclusive list of factors to be considered.").
67 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Los Angeles Cmty Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198,
201 (9th Cir. 1988) (adding the variable of whether the entity had the power to
take property in its own name); Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass 'n, 819 F.2d at
417 (considering whether the entity had the power to sue and be sued and
whether property belonging to the entity was immune from state taxation).
68 See Bladuell, supra note 23, at 840. (citing Jacintoport Corp. v.
Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Architectural Stone Co., 625 F.2d 22, 25
(5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the treatment of the entity in state courts is the
most important factor); Tuveson v. Fla. Governor's Council on Indian Affairs,
Inc., 734 F.2d 730, 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718,
723 (3d Cir. 1979) ("Several courts of appeals have regarded the final factor,
who ultimately pays, as most crucial.").
69 Feeney, 495 U.S. at 301 (1990).
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test.70 The result was immunity from suit in the Third Circuit, 71 but no
Eleventh Amendment protection in the Second.72 This divergence
between the appellate courts provided the perfect opportunity for the
Court to explicate the arm-of-the-state doctrine. Unfortunately, when
the Court first resolved the split between the Circuits, it did so without
providing any guidance as to the proper application of its ann-of-the-
state test.
73
Four years later, the Court again addressed the immunity of the
Port Authority in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation.
74
The Hess Court set forth a two-step, arm-of-the-state analysis which
was explicitly informed by the twin aims of the Eleventh Amendment -
protection of the state's treasury and protection of its dignity interests.75
The first prong of the inquiry focused on the dignity interests of the
state by seeking to determine if the state has sought to cloak a state
entity with Eleventh Amendment Immunity. This was accomplished
by examining various "indicators of immunity or the absence thereof'
in the structure of the state designed entity.76 In Hess, the key
indicators considered were (1) the extent of state control through
appointment of board members and the state's veto power over board
actions or its power to enlarge the entity's responsibilities; (2) how the
entity was characterized by the enabling and implementing legislation
and how the entity had been viewed by state courts; (3) whether the
entity performed functions that were normally performed by the state
70 The Third Circuit gave greater weight to the fact that state courts had
treated the Port Authority as a state agency that performed state functions. Port
Auth. Police Benevolent Ass 'n, 819 F.2d at 415. In contrast, the Second Circuit
focused on the fact that neither New York nor New Jersey was libel for the
debts of the entity. Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628,
631 (2d Cir. 1989), affd, 495 U.S. 299 (1990).
71 Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass 'n, 819 F.2d at 414.
72 Feeney, 873 F.2d 628, affd, 495 U.S. 299.
73 Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-09 (finding that because the lawsuit at issue
was tantamount to a claim against the States, the States had waived the Port
Authority's potential Eleventh Amendment Immunity by effectively consenting
to litigation).
74 513 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1994).
75 Id. at 39-41. Even the dissent in Hess agreed that the initial question
was whether "the State has structured the entity in the expectation that
immunity will inhere." Id. at 58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 44-46. Certain of the multi-factors previously relied upon in Mt.
Healthy and Lake Country Estates were re-characterized in Hess as "indicators
of immunity". See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
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compared to those of local or non-governmental activities; and (4)
whether the state was legally responsible for the debts of the entity."
If these indicators did not point in the same direction, then the
second stage of the analysis came into play. At this point, the most
salient consideration under a Hess Eleventh Amendment determination
was the vulnerability of the state treasury.7s Noting that the prevailing
view among the circuits was that the "'state treasury criterion' -
whether any judgment must be satisfied out of the state treasury - [was
the] most important consideration in resolving Eleventh Amendment
immunity issues," 79 the Court found that the Port Authority was not
entitled to immunity because neither New York nor New Jersey would,
as a legal or practical matter, be liable for any judgment against the
entity."
The emphasis placed by the Hess Court on the "practical" aspect
of the state treasury risk factor as the linchpin for immunity was soon
modified by its two most recent arm-of -the -state decisions relevant to
the issue of immunity for port authorities.81 First, in Regents of the
77 Id. at 44-46.
78 Id. at 47-48 (concluding that the indicators of the arm-of-the-state
analysis were ambiguous and shifting focus to protection of the state fisc). See
C.M. Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683,
1731-32 (1997) (criticizing the emphasis Hess places on the protection of the
state treasury as the primary component of the arm-or-the-state analysis as
inconsistent with broader Eleventh Amendment interests established by other
and more recent cases).
79 Id. at 51 (internal citation omitted).
80 Id. at 52. The Hess Court supported its ruling by specifically
recognizing the Port Authority as a "discrete entity created by constitutional
compact among three sovereigns" which was "financially self-sufficient" and
which "generate[d] its own revenues, and [paid] its own debts." Therefore, the
Court reasoned that "[r]equiring the Port Authority to answer in federal court to
injured railroad workers who assert a federal statutory right . . .to recover
damages [did] not touch the concerns-the States' solvency and dignity-that
underpin the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 52. See also, Analisa Dillingham,
Reaching for Immunity: The third Circuit's Approach to the Extension of
Eleventh Amendment Immunity to Instrumentalities as Arms of the State In
Benn v. First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, 51 VILL. L. REv. 999, 1004-
1005 (2006).
81 Since Hess, the Court also decided Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452
(1997), briefly discussing the arm-of-the-state test in a footnote while holding
that the Board of Police Commissioners was shielded by Eleventh Amendment
immunity because the state was not responsible for the Board's financial
liabilities and the only control the state exercised over the Board was the
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University of California v. Doe,82 a unanimous Court departed from the
"practical matter" focus, clarifying that the "relevant inquiry [was] not
merely a 'formalistic question of ultimate financial liability.' ' 8 3 Rather,
it was "the entity's potential legal liability, rather than its ability or
inability to require a third party to reimburse it, or to discharge the
liability in the first instance," that was germane to the arm-of-the-state
inquiry.84 Therefore, the fact that there was technically no risk to the
treasury of California due to an indemnification agreement which
protected the state from judgment against the University of California
arising from its operation of a laboratory85 did not suffice to divest the
University of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 6
Then, in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State
Ports Authority,8 7 the apparent imbalance between the weight accorded
by Hess to protection of the state fisc and a state's dignity was
apparently re-adjusted when the Court appeared to tip the scale in the
opposite direction. Despite delineating the twin reasons underlying the
Eleventh Amendment,88 the Hess opinion had strongly endorsed the
position maintained by the Courts of Appeals that "the vulnerability of
the State's purse [was] the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment
determinations." 89 In Federal Maritime Commission, the Court was
called upon to determine whether the South Carolina Ports Authority
appointment by the governor of four of the five Board members. Id. at 456 n.I.
In 2006, the Court also clarified that the approach to analyzing the issue of
sovereign immunity for a municipality or municipal corporation is the same for
all cases even where the action is brought pursuant to the general maritime law.
N. Ins. Co. N.Y. v. Chatham County, Ga., 547 U.S. 189 (2006). See generally,
Claiborne B. Smith, Sovereign Immunity of Municipalities in Admiralty: A
Look at Northern Insurance Co of New York v. Chatham County, Georgia, 31
TuL. MAR. L. J. 689 (2007).
82 519 U.S. 425 (1997). In Doe, the Court was called upon to determine
whether the University of California, in its operation of a laboratory, was acting
as an arm of the state. Id. at 429-32.
83 Benn v. First Jud. Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citing Doe, 519 U.S. at 431).
84 Doe, 519U.S. at431.
85 Id. at 428-31.
86 Id. at 431 (holding that "The Eleventh Amendment protects the State
from the risk of adverse judgments even though the State may be indemnified
by a third party.")
87 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
88 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
89 Hess, 513 U.S. at 48. See Bladuell, supra note 23, at 842 (criticizing
Hess for "ignor[ing] other legitimate Eleventh amendment interests" with its
"nearly exclusive focus on the vulnerability of the state's treasury").
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was an arm of the state able to claim sovereign immunity from suit
before an administrative agency, the Federal Maritime Commission.9"
Declaring Eleventh Amendment protection now extended beyond
actions brought by private parties in the courts to adjudications before
federal agencies, 9' the Court found that the Ports Authority was an arm
of the state, and consequently, the agency was barred from hearing the
suit.92 In so ruling, the Court emphasized that "the preeminent purpose
of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is
consistent with their status as sovereign entities. 93 In response to the
argument that sovereign immunity should not apply to the agency
proceedings because they do not present the same threat to the financial
integrity of States as do private judicial suits,94 the Court explained that
"[w]hile state sovereign immunity serves the important function of
shielding state treasuries ... the doctrine's central purpose is to accord
the States the respect owed to them as joint sovereigns." 95 The Court
went so far as to note that even if the relief sought by a private party
posed no threat to the state treasury, such as a cease - and - desist
order, sovereign immunity would still bar the action. "[T]he relief
sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether
the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 96
Unfortunately, the decisions in Hess, Doe, and Federal Maritime
Commission have failed to bring significant uniformity to the lower
court approaches to arm-of-the-state analysis. 97 In the wake of these
precedents, it appears there is still a fair amount of contradiction among
the lower courts concerning three basic issues. It is the differing
answers to these questions which constitute the primary variations in
90 Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 535 U.S. at 746-47.
91 Id. at 760.
92 Id. at 747 (ruling that the suit was barred by Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity).
9' Id. at 760.
94 Id. at 765.
95 Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
96 Id. at 765-66 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 512 U.S. 44, 58
(1996)) (Seminole tribe sued the state of Florida in federal court on the basis of
the state's refusal to negotiate in good faith regarding the inclusion of gaming
activities in tribal-state gaming compact.).
97 See Bladuell, supra note 23, at 842-47 (discussing aspects of the
various methods employed among the circuits and the lack of uniformity after
Hess); Dillingham, supra note 80, at 1012-26 (comparing the Third Circuit's
approach, which was modified after Doe and Federal Maritime Commission, to
the Eleventh Amendment Immunity approach employed by other circuits).
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application of the arm-of-the-state test resulting in the differing
approaches employed by the circuit courts.
First, is the question ofjust how much weight should be accorded
to the threat to the state treasury inquiry. In the aftermath of Hess, Doe,
and Federal Maritime Commission, circuit responses have varied, 98
ranging from relegating the issue of "financial liability to the status of
one factor co-equal with others in the immunity analysis" 99 to
continuing to place dispositive importance on the vulnerability of the
state's purse when other indicators of immunity point in different
directions. '00
98 While some circuits have changed the order or weight of the
indicators of immunity being considered, see, e.g., Fresenius Med. Care
Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & the Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp.,
322 F.3d 56, 68-69 (1st Cir. 2003) (reshaping its approach in the aftermath of
Hess and Doe), others have found that no change was warranted. See Bladuell,
supra note 23, at 844 ("The Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits did not
alter their arm-of-the-state test at all in response to Hess.").
99 Benn v. First Jud. Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2005); see
also Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletics Ass'n, 475 F.3d 524, 546 (3d Cir.
2007) (no longer ascribing primary importance to whether payment of
judgment would come from the state).
1oo See, e.g., Md. Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 407 F.3d 255,
261 (4th Cir. 2005) (giving greatest weight to threat to the state treasury factor
in its arm-of-the-state analysis); Clissaras v. City of N.Y., 359 F.3d 79, 82 (2d
Cir. 2004) (per curium) ("The extent to which the state would be responsible
for satisfying any judgment that might be entered against the defendant entity"
is the "most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment determinations."); S.J. v.
Hamilton County, 374 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir. 2004) (observing that values
beyond guarding public fise play a role in any arm-of-the-state analysis, but
concluding that "[its] precedents and the Supreme Court's case law still single
out the factor of responsibility for a judgment as the most important (albeit not
exclusive) determinant of arm-of-the-state status.").
Some circuits have endorsed the position that the holding in Federal
Maritime Commission "did not substantially modify the analytical framework
established by Hess" at all. Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 241-42 (2d Cir 2006) ("When the Supreme Court stated in
[Federal Maritime Commission] that state sovereign immunity's central
purpose is to accord the States the respect owed them as joint sovereigns ... it
was merely reiterating a long-established and non-controversial principle. It
was not stating a new rule of law or casting doubt on intervening precedents
such as Hess."). This argument has some merit. In Federal Maritime
Commission, the Court was not determining whether an entity was entitled to
Eleventh Amendment Immunity; it was simply considering "the consequences
of such immunity" in a federal agency setting. Brief for Intervenors, P.R. Ports
Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 2007 WL 2344792 at *15 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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A companion issue is whether the arm-of-the-state inquiry should
focus on a state's overall responsibility for funding an entity or paying
its debts or judgment or whether the question should be whether the
state would be responsible legally to pay the judgment in the specific
litigation at issue. 01 Another facet of this question is whether a court
should consider the ultimate impact an adverse judgment might have on
its treasury even though the state is not legally liable for the judgment
in the specific litigation. In seeking immunity, state created entities
often argue that even if the state treasury is not legally responsible for a
judgment against the entity, the practical ramifications of a multi-
million dollar judgment may ultimately require the state to reallocate
resources which would directly affect the state treasury.10 2 Currently,
while one circuit may give little weight to such arguments, 0 3 another
may take such "practical realities" threats to the state treasury into
consideration in reaching its final ruling.' 4
1o1 Compare P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed Mar. Comm'n, 531 F.3d 868,
879-80 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (adopting the "overall" approach and thus focusing on
whether the Commonwealth was legally liable for PRPA's actions in any
instance, irrespective of whether it would be liable for the particular Arbitration
Award at issue in the case) with Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, International
Shipping Agency, Inc. v. P.R. Ports Auth., 2008 WL 4525349 at *16-17 (U.S.)
(arguing that the D.C. Circuit's "all or nothing" approach to analyzing the
threat to the treasury factor ignores the clear intent of the Puerto Rico
legislature which was "to create an entity that would act as an agent of the
Commonwealth for some purposes (thus rendering the Commonwealth liable
for damages), but would also act as an independent corporation ... for other
purposes (in which case the Commonwealth would not be liable for
damages.)").
102 See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
in Support of Petitioner Puerto Rico Ports Authority, P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed.
Mar. Comm'n, 2007 WL 2344794 at *15-16 (D.C. Cir.) (discussing indirect
ramifications of potential orders and reparations on Commonwealth's treasury).
103 Febres v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 445F.3d 227, 234-36 (3d Cir.
2006). In Febres, where the state was not legally required to pay any adverse
judgment against the Board, the court rejected the Board's argument that a
judgment against it would have the practical effect of requiring state to
replenish its funds, stating that while "the practical or indirect financial effects
of a judgment may enter a court's calculus" they "rarely have significant
bearing on a determination of an entity's status as an arm of the state." A
state's legal liability (or lack thereof) for an entity's debts merits far greater
weight, and is therefore the key factor in our assessment of the state-treasury
prong of the [arm-of-the-state] analysis. Id. at 236.
104 Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1327 (1ith Cir. 2003) (where no
Georgia law expressly required state to pay adverse judgment against Sheriff
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Finally, in Doe, the Court specifically reserved the issue of
"whether there may be some state instrumentalities that qualify as
'arms-of-the-state' for some purposes but not for others."' °5 As the
lower courts have applied the ever more complex test of arm-of-the-
state immunity, the question of whether the immunity status of an
entity can change from case to case has become a fundamental
difference in the approach taken by the circuits.1
0 6
II1. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND SURROUNDING
THE CARNIVAL LITIGATION
In Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. Carnival Corporation,10 7 the
U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico issued a rather short opinion and
order staying an action to dismiss until the issue of personal jurisdiction
was resolved in a lawsuit involving identical events previously filed in
the Southern District of Florida.'0 8 While the opinion primarily focused
on the more mundane aspects of the first-filed rule,'0 9 what is of
interest about the case are the facts underlying Carnival Corporation's
acting in his official capacity, the court emphasized that state funds would
nevertheless be "implicated" because the Sheriff, who would have to pay the
judgment out of the budget for the Sheriff's Office and the "practical reality"
was he would have to "recoup" the money for his depleted budget "from
somewhere."). Arguably, such reallocations not only affect the state's purse,
but also begin to infringe upon the state's autonomy in making its own policy
determinations and its dignity interests. See Bladuell, supra note 23, at 850
("For example, if a. . . port authority is not entitled to immunity because of its
traditional financial independence, a multimillion-dollar judgment against it
would inevitably interfere with the state's transportation affairs because money
earmarked for financing operations or new development projects would have to
be reallocated to satisfy the judgment.").
'O' Doe, 519 U.S. at 428 n.2.
106 Compare P. R. Ports Auth., 531 F.3d at 873 (holding that "The
status of an entity does not change from one case to the next based on ...
variable factors. Rather, once an entity is determined to be an arm of the state..
.that conclusion applies unless and until there are relevant changes in the state
law governing the entity.") with Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308 (stating that
"[w]hether a defendant is an 'arm of the State' must be assed in light of the
particular function in which the defendant was engaged when taking the actions
out of which liability is asserted to arise.")
107 2008 WL 4449957 (D. Puerto Rico).
108 Id. at *2.
109 Id. at *I ("The United States court of Appeals for the First Circuit
has held that where the overlap between two lawsuits is nearly complete, the
usual practice is for the court that first had jurisdiction to resolve the issues and
the other court to defer.").
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(Carnival) motion to dismiss, PRPA's opposition to such action, and
the possible ramifications of the Carnival case for the confirmation of
arbitral awards in cases involving port authorities.
First established in 1942 as the Puerto Rico Transportation
Authority, the PRPA was created by Puerto Rico law as "a government
instrumentality and public corporation with a legal existence and
personality separate and apart from those of the Government and
officials thereof."" 0  According to the Enabling Act, its statutory
purpose is to "develop and improve, own, operate, and manage any and
all types of air and marine transportation facilities and services" in
order to "promot[e] the general welfare and increas[e] commerce and
prosperity of the Commonwealth.""' By statute, it performs
governmental functions "including managing Puerto Rico's ports...
and regulating navigation in Puerto Rico's harbors."'" 2 "The first
impression of Puerto Rico a tourist receives upon arrival to the island is
that which arises from services provided by the authority."
'" 13
Statutory law also provides that the PRPA be governed by a
Board composed of five directors which are appointed by the Governor
of the Commonwealth." 4 Four of the five directors may be removed by
the governor at will, the fifth may be removed for cause." 5 An opinion
by the Puerto Rico Attorney General also "previously opined that the
Governor of Puerto Rico retains control of Puerto Rico's public
corporations. 16
The Commonwealth also exercises controls over the rule making
power of the PRPA." 7 The legislature can exercise its plenary authority
over the PRPA by amending the enabling act" 8 or divest the PRPA of
any one of its powers. " 9
10 P.R. Act No. 125 of 1942, § 3(b); P.R. Act No. 65 of 1989, § 3(b);
23 L.P.R.A. §333(a-b)(2004).
.' 23 L.P.R.A. § 333(b).
12 P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 531 F.3d 868, 870 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, § 348 (a)).
"3 P.R. Act No. 65 of 1989 at 271-72.
114 23 L.P.R.A.§ 334; P.R. Ports Auth., 531 F.3d at 870.
"' P.R. Ports Auth., 531 F.3d at 870.
116 Id. at 878 (citing 1992 Op. Atty. Gen. PR 103 (Sept. 21, 1992)).
117 23 L.P.R.A. §§ 2109, 2205, and 2505-07.
"' See, e.g., P.R. Act No. 65 of August 17, 1989.
"19 See Camacho v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 369 F.3d 570, 575-76
(I st Cir. 2004) (finding that Commonwealth legislature had transferred pilotage
to new commission).
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As a public corporation, however, the PRPA "can sue and be
sued" and enter into contracts, 20 and its debts and funds are separate
from those of the Commonwealth. 12' In addition, PRPA "is not
financed out of the Commonwealth's general revenues."' 122 Rather, it is
primarily funded "through user fees and bonds."' 23 By law, however,
the Commonwealth is responsible for paying certain judgments arising
from lawsuits against the PRPA but only in specific instances. "In
particular, the Dock and Harbor Act makes the Commonwealth directly
liable for certain torts committed by PRPA's officers, employees, or
agents when they are acting in their official capacity and within the
scope of their function, employment, or agency relationship."'3
24
The controversy in Carnival can be traced back to an economic
development project begun in 1996 when the Governor decided that the
key to securing Puerto Rico's economic future was an increase in
tourism. 25 To achieve this end, the waterfront and harbor area of the
Port of San Juan (Port) was redeveloped with a new convention center
and cruise ship terminals replacing existing cargo operations.26
On June 7, 2001, PRPA and Carnival entered into a Pier and
Terminal Usage Agreement (Agreement) which provided for "the
redevelopment and preferential use of a cruise ship terminal" known as
"Pier 4" in the Port.127  The Agreement further provided that all
disputes would be submitted to arbitration in San Juan and that any
arbitration would be "governed by, and construed and enforced in
accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
without giving effect to the choice of law provisions thereof."'
128
On August 3, 2004, Carnival filed a demand for arbitration
claiming that PRPA had breached the Agreement by increasing the fees
120 P.R. Ports Auth., 531 F.3d at 879 (citing § 336(e-f)).
121 Id. (under Puerto Rico law, PRPA's "debts, obligations, contracts,
bonds, notes, debentures, receipts, expenditures, accounts, funds, undertakings,
and properties.., shall be deemed to be those of said government controlled




124 Id. at 880 (citing § 2303).
125 Id. at 871.
126 Id.
127 Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Carnival's Motion to
Dismiss, P.R. Ports Auth. v. Carnival Corp., 2007 WL 4764459 (D. Puerto
Rico).
128 id.
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it charged Carnival by more than two percent during a twelve month
period. According to Carnival, in return for its promise in 2001 to
redevelop the cruiseship terminal, the PRPA not only agreed to
reimburse Carnival for the costs of the redevelopment plus interest and
granted Carnival a 20 year "preferential use" of Pier 4, the parties had
also agreed that the PRPA was prohibited from increasing any rates
levied on Carnival by more than two percent per year for 20 years.
129
The matter came before the International Center for Dispute
Resolution, a division of the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") in July 2006130 and on July 9, 2007, the AAA panel issued an
award 13 (Award) in San Juan in Carnival's favor. 132 Eight days after
receiving the Award, Carnival filed an action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking confirmation
of the award. 33 In response, PRPA filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction and also maintained that it was entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. 134 PRPA
also responded by filing a Petition to Vacate the Arbitration Award on
September 27, 2007, in the Commonwealth Superior Court. 
135
Carnival's reply was to remove the case to the Federal District court for
the District of Puerto Rico and to simultaneously file a Motion to
Dismiss predicated on the ground that the identical action was already
pending before the district court in Florida.' 36 Currently, the action is
129 Id.
130 P.R. Ports Auth. v. Carnival Corp., 2008 WL 4449957, *1 (D.
Puerto Rico).
13' No. 50 181 T 00391 04 (July 9, 2007).
132 Id. According to the award, Carnival was to receive "an escrow
account containing approximately ten million dollars in fees collected pursuant
to the [PRPA's] Tariff' and the PRPA was "effectively enjoined ... from
collecting the full amounts of future fees" it was due "for providing services to
Carnival vessels and passengers." In total, the award granted Carnival
approximately $61 million dollars in subsidies over 17 years. Reply
Memorandum in Opposition to Carnival's Motion to Dismiss, P.R. Ports Auth.
v. Carnival Corp., 2007 WL 4764459 (D. Puerto Rico).
133 Id. (citing Civil No. 07-mc-21850 (DLG)). Under the Puerto Rico
Arbitration Act, while "judicial confirmation is not required to perfect an
award," a party "may file an action to confirm an arbitration award within one
year of receiving an award." Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Carnival's
Motion to Dismiss, P.R. Ports Auth. v. Carnival Corp., 2007 WL 4764459 (D.




180 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 5.153
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
still pending in Florida and the proceedings have been stayed in Puerto
Rico pending the resolution of the jurisdictional challenges before the
southern District of Florida. 1
7
Clearly, the goal of PRPA is to have its Petition to Vacate the
Award heard in a Commonwealth court. 38 The Commonwealth enjoys
the same measure of sovereign immunity as a state. 39 So, in terms of
litigation strategy, it appears that the PRPA is maintaining the position
that because it is cloaked with Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit in federal court as an arm of the Commonwealth, any action to
confirm or vacate the Arbitration Award must be brought in
Commonwealth courts where the Award's violation of Commonwealth
law and public policy should be easily determined. The key to the
PRPA achieving its goal of forum selection is for the entity to convince
the federal district court that it is entitled to the cloak of sovereign
immunity. The pivotal move in winning the coveted protection of the
Eleventh Amendment, however, may be in being able to control which
district court will engage in the arm-of-the-state inquiry. Unfortunately
for the PRPA, there is no uniform arm-of-the-state analysis employed
by all federal courts. Therefore, whether the PRPA is found to be an
arm of the Commonwealth may be entirely dependent on which federal
137 Id. at *2.
138 Pursuant to Puerto Rico's arbitration law, Commonwealth courts
have jurisdiction over actions to confirm or vacate awards. 23 L.P.R.A. § 3221.
For example, under the laws of the Commonwealth, Carnival would have had
one year from the date the Award was issued to bring a motion to confirm in
commonwealth court. Id. If the Motion to Vacate is ultimately heard in the
Commonwealth Superior Court, it needs to be remembered that Carnival can
respond to the Motion to Vacate and request Confirmation of the Award.
Commonwealth arbitration law does appear to provide substantially the same
rights as the Federal Arbitration Act. See 23 L.P.R.A. §§ 3201. However, there
is always the proverbial risk for Carnival of running afoul of possible state
court bias. The premise underlying diversity jurisdiction and removal stems
from concerns of possible state prejudice against non-citizens. "The
constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire), that
state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might
sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the
regular administration of justice." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 345
(1816) (Story, J.).
139 Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 697 (lst Cir. 1983)
("Puerto Rico, despite the lack of formal statehood, enjoys the shelter of the
Eleventh Amendment in all respects."); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects &
Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 586-94 (1976); see also P.R. Fed.
Affairs Admin. V. Rodriguez, 435 F.3d 378 (D.C. Cir 2006), cert. denied, 549
U.S. 812 (2006).
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court ultimately hears the sovereign immunity issue due to the vagaries
between the different approaches employed by the various circuits.
IV. A PERTINENT SAMPLING OF THE CIRCUITS: HOW
WOULD CARNIVAL FARE?
The Carnival litigation is currently pending in the southern
district of Florida. If the court finds that it has proper jurisdiction and
the case goes forward, the court would employ the arm-of-the-state
analysis crafted by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 40  If,
however, the Florida district court dismisses for lack of jurisdiction, it
will fall to the Federal District Court of Puerto Rico to grapple with the
sovereign immunity issue as it utilizes the arm-of-the-state inquiry
propounded by the First Circuit.'
4'
Under the Eleventh Circuit approach, to determine whether an
entity is an arm-of-the-state in carrying out a particular function, a four
factor analysis is employed: (1) how the entity is defined by state
law; 142 (2) the degree of control exercised by the state over the entity;
(3) how the entity is funded; and (4) who bears responsibility for
satisfying adverse judgments against the entity.' 43 In terms of the
weight to be given the risk to the state treasury factor, the Eleventh
Circuit has stated that no single factor is dispositive, yet the source of
the entity's funds and responsibility for satisfying judgments is of
"considerable importance."1 44 In addition, the court has noted that the
140 The Eleventh Circuit hears cases from the federal district courts
located in Alabama, Georgia & Florida. See Circuit Court Map available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/courtlinks (last visited March 24, 2009).
141 The First Circuit hears cases from federal district courts located in
Maine, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Puerto Rico See
Circuit Court Map available at http://www.uscourts.gov/courtlinks (last visited
March 24, 2009).
142 The ultimate issue of whether an entity is an arm-of-the-state for
eleventh Amendment purposes is a question of federal law. However, this
question can only be answered "after considering provisions of state law."
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309 (1 th Cir. 2003) (citing Doe, 519 U.S. at
429 n.5 (noting that the Eleventh Amendment question "can be answered only
after considering the provisions of state law that define the agency's
character")); Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280 (stating that whether an entity is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity "depends, at least in part, upon the
nature of the entity created by state law").
143 id.
144 Vierling v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 339 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir.
2003) (quoting Doe, 519 U.S. at 430.). In Vierling, the Eleventh Circuit held
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Supreme Court has never "required an actual drain on the state treasury
as a per se condition of Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .The
State's integrity is not limited to who foots the bill . . . ,, 4' Further,
The Eleventh Circuit has also given due consideration to the "practical
reality" argument 46 that an adverse judgment against a state-created
entity may threaten the state fisc even where the state has no legal
responsibility to pay the judgment. 147 In Manders v. Lee, the court
found an entity was entitled to immunity despite no legal liability
because "a significant adverse judgment" would ultimately implicate
state funds.
48
In contrast, the First Circuit specifically re-designed its approach
to an arm-of-the-state inquiry in Fresenius Medical Care
Cardiovascular Resources, Inc. v. Puerto Rico & The Caribbean
Cardiovascular Center Corp. in order to emulate the analysis of
Hess. 4 9 It now employs a two-step analysis, with multiple factors
instructive for each step. The first step inquires whether "the state [has]
clearly structured the entity to share its sovereignty."' 50 If, however,
"the factors assessed in analyzing the structure point in different
directions," under the second step, "the dispositive question concerns
the risk that the damages will be paid from the public treasury .... This
analysis focuses on whether the state has legally or practically
obligated itself to pay the entity's indebtedness."' 15'
In applying these standards in Fresenius, the court examined the
structure of the entity by looking at its enabling act, how it was treated
by other statutes, how the entity was viewed in state court decisions,
that the Port Everglades Port was not an arm of the state entitled to eleventh
Amendment immunity. Id. at 1314. In so ruling, the court found that the Port
Authority was characterized by state law "as an entity of the county, not the
state;" that "the state had no control over the operation" of the Port facilities;
and, most importantly, that "the Port Authority [was] a totally self-sufficient
enterprise that receive[d] no financial support from the state" and which would
be solely responsible for any adverse judgments against it. Id. at 1314-15.
141 Manders, 338 F.3d at 1327 (internal citations omitted).
146 See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
147 Manders, 338 F.3d at 1327.
148 Id. at 1327-28 ("Sheriff Peterson . . . would have to pay any
adverse federal court judgment against him in his official capacity out of the
budget of the sheriff's office... If a significant adverse judgment occurs....
state funds are implicated because Sheriff Peterson would need to seek a
greater total budget from.., the State.").
149 322 F.3d 56,68 (lst Cir. 2003).
150 Id.
151 Id.
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the functions of the entity (whether they were governmental or
proprietary), and the control exercised by the Commonwealth over the
entity.' 52 Because the "indicia" did not "all point in the direction" of
the corporation being an arm of the Commonwealth, the court went on
to the second stage of the analysis and examined whether the
Commonwealth's treasury would be responsible for paying any
judgment against the entity.153
The court first explained that if the state is not obligated legally
or practically to bear and pay the indebtedness of an enterprise whose
expenditures have exceeded its receipts, then "the Eleventh
Amendment's core concern [protection of the state treasury] is not
implicated."' 154 The court then noted that it was clear based upon the
enabling act that the Commonwealth was not liable for the debts of the
entity. 55 It then went on to determine that the Commonwealth had not
practically "assumed that obligation in fact, either directly or
indirectly," by providing the operating funds needed by the entity for
its operation. 156 It ended its analysis by rejecting the entity's "practical
reality" argument, finding that simply because "a judgment would
deplete its operating funds" and "that the Commonwealth might choose
to rescue" the entity which "would indirectly deplete the state treasury"
was insufficient for it receive Eleventh Amendment immunity.57
As the comparison of the two approaches demonstrates, the
major differences between the approaches employed by these two
circuits are the weight accorded to the threat to treasury factor and the
consideration given to "practical reality" threats to the treasury.
58
152 Id. at 68 - 72.
"'3 Id. at 72.
154 Id. (quoting Hess, 513 U.S. at 51).
155 Fresenius, 322 F. 3d at 72.
156 Id. at 72-75.
117 Id. at 75.
158 Both circuits seem to agree that an entity might be entitled to
immunity in one circumstance but not in another depending upon the function
in which it was engaged. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
According to Eleventh Circuit precedent, whether an entity is an arm-of-the-
state will be assessed in light of the particular function in which the entity was
engaged. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308,
1311 (11th Cir. 2000) ("The pertinent inquiry is not into the nature of [an
entity's] status in the abstract, but its function or role in a particular context.").
Therefore, a state instrumentality might "qualify as an 'arm-of-the-state' for
some purposes but not for others." In Fresenius, the First Circuit stated it was
restructuring its arm-of-the-state analysis to comport with Hess. Frenesius, 322
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While the Eleventh Circuit simply looks at the risk to the treasury as
one of four factors to be considered, the First Circuit ultimately gives
disproportionate weight to protecting the state fisc, the linchpin of step
two of its analysis. Due to the numerous indicators of immunity the
First Circuit examines to determine whether the entity has been
structured to share in the state's sovereignty, 159 it is difficult to imagine
that situations would frequently arise which would not require the court
to move on to the second step two of its arm-of-the-state inquiry.
Consequently, the First Circuit arm-of-the-state inquiry must frequently
give disproportionate weight to the concern that the state treasury might
be liable for any damages. It also appears clear that while the Eleventh
Circuit has found "practical reality" arguments persuasive, the First
Circuit gives little, if any, credence to such contentions.
These differences take on enormous importance when the facts
surrounding the Carnival litigation are closely examined. Arguably,
the "Achilles heel" of the PRPA's case for sovereign immunity is the
threat to the state treasury factor under the enabling legislation, the
PRPA has financial autonomy from the Commonwealth 160 and the
Commonwealth is not legally responsible for the Arbitration Award
16 1
F.3d at 69. Hess, however, did not address this issue. In fact, Doe which post-
dates Hess, specifically left the issue open. Doe, 519 U.S. at 428 n.2. The
logical conclusion is that Fresenius did not overrule or contradict prior First
Circuit case law on this issue. Prior to its decision in Fresenius, the First Circuit
had held that the PRPA was an arm of the state for some purposes, but not for
others. P.R. Ports Auth. v. MN Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir.
1990) ("After examining the pertinent statues, we conclude that whether the
PRPA is entitled to eleventh amendment immunity protection depends upon the
type of activity it engages in and the nature of the claim asserted against it.").
See also Royal Caribbean Corp v. P.R. Ports Auth., 973 F.2d .8, 9 (1st Cir.
1992) ("We must answer this question in respect to the particular 'type of
activity' by the Ports Authority that is the object of the plaintiffs claims.").
159 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. When applying the first
step of its two-step test, the First Circuit evaluates the structure of the state
created entity in light of the numerous and varied factors described in Hess, 513
U.S. at 44-46 (4 factors), Lake County, 440 U.S. at 401-402 (6 factors), and its
prior decision, Metcalf & Eddy Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d
935, 939-40 (1st Cir. 1993) (7 factors). Fresenius, 322 F. 3d at 62 nn. 5-6, 65
n.7, 68.
160 See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
161 P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 531 F.3d 868, 879 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) ("under Puerto Rico law, PRPA's 'debts, obligations, contracts,
bonds, notes, debentures, receipts, expenditures, accounts, funds, undertakings
and properties ... shall be deemed to be those of said government controlled
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that orders "a $61 million subsidy to Carnival while barring the
[PRPA] from recovering its costs". 162
Despite this weakness, under the Eleventh Circuit's arm-of-the-
state inquiry, the PRPA still might fare quite well. Application of both
the first and second prongs of the Eleventh Circuit's four part analysis
indicates that immunity might be in order. Under the first prong, which
examines how the entity is defined by state law, it is relevant that the
PRPA is defined as a "government instrumentality" which performs
governmental functions. 63 In addition, the Commonwealth has filed an
Amicus Curiae brief in Carnival, which states that the Commonwealth
"specifically agrees with the [PRPA's] position that it is an arm or alter
ego of the Commonwealth, and thus is entitled to share in the
Commonwealth's sovereign immunity from suit in federal fora.'164
Although as a public corporation the PRPA can enter into
contracts and sue and be sued, 165 the Commonwealth does maintain a
fair degree of control over the entity through the Board of Directors
and the plenary power of the legislature, 166 which is probably sufficient
to satisfy the second prong of the inquiry.
Application of the third prong of the test, however, may militate
against immunity. The facts surrounding Carnival establish that the
debts and funds of the PRPA are separate from those of the
Commonwealth 167 and that the entity does not receive funding from the
Commonwealth.168  Rather, the PRPA is financially independent,
funding itself via "user fees and bonds."'169
It is quite possible, however, that the PRPA's claim of immunity
may be saved by the final factor of who will be responsible for any
judgments against the entity. If the court focuses only on the legal or
corporation, and not those of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico."' (citing P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 23, §333(b) (1989))).
162 Amicus Curiae Memorandum in support of the Motion to Remand
of the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, P.R. Ports Auth. v. Carnival Corp., 2008
WL 822349 (D. Puerto Rico).
163 See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
164 Amicus Curiae Memorandum in support of the Motion to Remand
of the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, P.R. Ports Auth. 2008 WL 822349.
165 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 114 -119 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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practical responsibility for the judgment factor, the Commonwealth has
no such duty vis-a-vis the Arbitration Award.' 70  But the Eleventh
Circuit has been known to also consider the "practical realities" of a
judgment and to recognize that no "actual drain on the state treasury" is
required for a finding of sovereign immunity "because the basic
purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was to protect "the dignity and
,,171integrity of a state ....
In Carnival, the Commonwealth has maintained the position that
the "practical reality" is "that the Commonwealth dictates the [PRPA's]
funding mechanism and expressly requires it to cover its expenses.
172
Further, the Commonwealth has asserted that any argument by Carnival
"that the Commonwealth treasury will not have to satisfy any judgment
ignores the practical reality of the Award's impact on the [PRPA's]
funding source and, thereby, the disruption it causes the
Commonwealth's funding structure for the [PRPA]. 173 Therefore, there
is a strong possibility that in balancing all factors, the Eleventh Circuit
might find that the PRPA was entitled to wear the cloak of sovereign
immunity.
Although the PRPA may have a chance of prevailing on its claim
of sovereign immunity in the Eleventh Circuit, it is hard to contemplate
such an outcome given the approach currently endorsed by the First
Circuit.
As can be seen from the analysis of the facts of Carnival under
the Eleventh Circuit's approach to arm-of-the-state inquires, the
indicators under the first step of the First Circuit's two-part test would
point in different directions. 174 Therefore, the court would turn to the
170 P.R. Ports Auth. 531 F.3d at 879; see supra note 161 and
accompanying text. It should be noted that the Arbitration Award did not order
the PRPA to pay any monies to Carnival. Rather, it ordered approximately $61
million dollars in subsidies over 17 years and barred the PRPA from recovering
its costs.
171 Amicus Curiae Memorandum in support of the Motion to Remand
of the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, P.R. Ports Auth. 2008 WL 822349 (quoting
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1324-28 (11 th Cir. 2003)).
172 "[I1n fulfilling its public responsibilities, the Enabling Act requires
the [PRPA] to recover its costs and expenses through the establishment of fair
and reasonable fees, rents and charges the users of the Port facilities and
services." Id. (citing 23 L.P.R.A. § 336(i) (1989)).
173 Id.
174 See supra notes 163-169 and accompanying text. Compare P.R.
Ports Auth. 531 F. 3d at 870 (setting forth factors weighing in favor of
immunity) with Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Int'l Shipping Agency, Inc. v.
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question of whether there was any risk to the state treasury. 75 Because
the First Circuit considers only legal or practical liability for a
judgment to constitute a true threat to the state's purse 176 and has
generally found little merit in arguments concerning "practical
realities,"' 17 7 and the Commonwealth has no legal liability for the
Arbitration Award, it is unlikely that the First Circuit would find that
the PRPA was entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection in the instant
circumstances of Carnival. 178
A sampling of the arm-of-the-state tests of the various circuits
which may impact the PRPA's assertion of Eleventh Amendment
immunity would not be complete without examining the law of the
D.C. Circuit. While the Carnival case would not come before this
court, the D.C. Circuit recently ruled on the exact issue of sovereign
immunity arising in Carnival in its 2008 decision, Puerto Rico Ports
Authority v. Federal Maritime Commission.1 9 Irrespective of the D.C.
Circuit's position that its conclusion in Puerto Rico Ports Authority that
the PRPA is entitled to sovereign immunity 180 can be reconciled with
P.R. Ports Auth., 2008 WL 4525349, at * 1I (U.S.) (reviewing relevant statutes
and First Circuit decisions regarding the status of the PRPA, which illustrate
numerous factors weighing against immunity).
175 See supra notes 150-151.
176 See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
177 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
178 As previously mentioned, Carnival is currently pending in federal
district court in Florida while the court considers the PRPA's motion to dismiss
on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction. See supra notes 133-134 and
accompanying text. In light of the fact that it appears more problematic for the
PRPA to prevail under the First Circuit's current approach to the arm-of-the-
state doctrine than under that of the Eleventh Circuit, the question arises as to
whether the entity was wise in bringing this jurisdictional challenge.
"9 531 F.3d 868 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The dispute in Puerto Rico Ports
Authority stemmed from the PRPA's "relocation of private marine terminal
operators, as well as certain post-relocation practices and conditions at the new
facilities." Id. at 871. Three marine terminal operators filed complaints with
the Federal Maritime Commission, which alleged violations of the Shipping
Act of 1984 and sought a cease-and-desist order and in excess of $100 million
in total damages. Id. By a vote of 3-2, the Federal Maritime Commission found
that the PRPA did not qualify for immunity as an arm-of-the-state, and ruled
that the regulatory adjudication of the privately filed complaint before the
federal agency could proceed. Id. In Puerto Rico Ports Authority, the PRPA
sought judicial review of the Commission's determination.
180 Id. at 880 ("when considered all together, the three arm-of-the-state
factors - intent, control, and overall effects on the treasury - lead us to
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the First Circuit's ruling in Fresenius,"8 ' the reality is that the court's
interpretation of Hess182 has led it to fashion an analysis which is rather
unique.
Under its three-factor test, the D.C. Circuit examines "(1) the
State's intent as to the status of the entity, including the functions
performed by the entity; (2) the State's control over the entity; and (3)
the entity's overall effect on the State treasury."'183 It is the court's
adoption of the "all or nothing" approach to immunity, i.e., "once
immune, always immune," which constitutes a significant departure
from the approaches of other circuits.' 84
In answering the question which the Supreme Court left open in
Doe,185 the Puerto Rico Ports Authority court maintained that "[t]he
status of an entity does not change from one case to the next based on
the nature of the suit, the State's fimancial responsibility in one case as
compared to another, or other variable factor." 186 Therefore, "once an
entity is determined to be an arm of the State under the three-factor test,
that conclusion applies unless and until there are relevant changes in
state law governing the entity."
18 7
Given this "all or nothing approach" to sovereign immunity, it is
only logical that the court would engage in an analysis which
considered the overall threat to the state fisc, not the specific threat in
conclude that PRPA is an arm of the Commonwealth entitled to sovereign
immunity.").
181 Id. at 881 n. 10 (The court distinguished the facts of Puerto Rico
Ports Authority from those of Fresenius by noting that the enabling act in
Fresenius "did not label the entity a government instrumentality", nor did the
entity in Frenesius "perform governmental functions," nor were the entity's
employees statutorily defined as "public employees," nor did the Governor
"have the power to remove Board members.").
182 Id. at 874 ("In sum, Hess confirms that we must apply the three-
factor arm-of-the-state test and look to state intent, state control, and overall
effect on state treasury.").
183 Id. at 873.
184 See supra note 158. See also DeGenova v. Sheriff of Dupage Cty.,
209 F.3d 973, 975 (7th Cir. 2000)("[w]hether a sheriff acts for the state or a
local entity is not an 'all or nothing' determination. Rather, the question is
whether, when a sheriff acts in a particular area or on a particular issue, he acts
for the State or a local entity.") (quoting McMillan v. Monroe County, Ala.,
520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997)).; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Int'l Shipping
Agency, Inc. 2008 WL 4525349, at *3 (U.S.).
185 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
186 P.R. Ports Auth., 531 F. 3d at 873.
187 1,4
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the instant case. According to the court, the focus should be on the
closeness of the overall relationship between the entity and the state to
determine if the state is more than a mere "financial backstop" for the
entity. 188  Although this approach appears to be unique to the D.C.
Circuit, 189 for the court to have engaged in any other analysis would
have contravened the entire premise underlying its "all or nothing"
concept.
In applying step three of its three-factor test, the D.C. Circuit
found a risk to the state's purse despite concluding that the
Commonwealth had no legal or practical liability for any judgment
against the PRPA resulting from the actions brought by the marine
terminal operators. 190  In examining the "overall effects on the
Commonwealth's treasury,"' 9' the court highlighted that under the
Dock and Harbor Act, the Commonwealth was "directly liable for
certain torts committed by PRPA's officers, employees, or agents when
they are acting in their official capacity and within the scope of their
function, employment, or agency relationship."' 192  Because the
Commonwealth was "legally liable for some of PRPA's actions" and "a
substitute for PRPA ... in certain cases" the D.C. Circuit held that it
would be "factually incorrect" to suggest that the actions of the PRPA
did "not affect the state treasury."'
193
V. CONCLUSION - CONFUSING OUTCOMES,
UNPREDICTABILITY & A NEED FOR UNIFORMITY
As illustrated by the contingent outcomes in the Carnival
litigation under the differing approaches of the Eleventh and First
Circuits and the review of the Puerto Rico Ports Authority decision
recently rendered by the D.C. Circuit, the current state of arm-of-the-
state jurisprudence has become a labyrinth, rife with non-uniformity
and clearly in need of clarification. '94 It is only through uniformity
188 Id. at 880.
189 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Int'l Shipping Agency, Inc. 2008 WL
4525349, at *3 (U.S.).
19' P.R. Ports Auth., 531 F. 3d at 873.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 880.
193 Id. at 879-880.
194 See James G. Wilson, The Eleventh Amendment Cases: Going Too
Far with Judicial Neofederalism, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1687, 1688 - 89 (2000)
("Eleventh Amendment doctrine contains... confusing outcomes that are even
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that predictability in judgments may be achieved. Such uniformity is
particularly desirable in cases involving state created entities, such as
port authorities, who possess the autonomy to contract and to agree to
the arbitration of disputes but who may fall within the protection of
Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit to enforce an Arbitration
Award. Achieving uniformity in both the contours and application of
the arm-of-the-state doctrine will assist private parties entering into
agreements with such a state created entity in planning accordingly so
that they may ensure that if there is a dispute between the parties, any
arbitration award issued in their favor will be worth more than the
paper on which it is printed.
Presently, a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is pending before the
Supreme Court in the Puerto Rico Ports Authority case. 19' This
opinion serves as an excellent foil against which to compare and
contrast the discrepancies between the various arm-of-the-state tests
circulating among the courts of appeals. Thus, the stage is set for the
Court to address the overall problems in this area of jurisprudence and
provide much needed direction if it chooses to do so. It must be hoped
the Court will not decline this opportunity to specifically address the
questions raised by the different applications of the various approaches
being employed by the circuit courts. Such clarification should enable
the lower courts to uniformly engage in an integrated and holistic
analysis of a state created entity's relationship with its maker to
determine if the offspring is truly entitled to the sovereign immunity
protection afforded to the King.
less comprehensible now that the doctrine has become so broad and
dynamic.").
195 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 189.
